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For many years, dynamic pricing has proven to be an effective tool to increase revenue in the airline and other service industries. Most
studies, however, focused on monopolistic models and ignored the fact that nowadays consumers can easily compare prices on the Inter-
net. In this paper, we develop a game-theoretic model to describe real-time dynamic price competition between firms that sell substitut-
able products. By assuming the real-time inventory levels of all firms are public information, we show the existence of Nash equilibrium.
We then discuss how a firm can adapt if it knows only the initial – but not the real-time – inventory levels of its competitors. We compare
a firm’s expected revenue under different information structures through numerical experiments.
 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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Dynamic pricing is a business strategy that adjusts the product price in real-time in order to maximize profit. Dynamic
pricing has been widely used in the travel industries, such as airlines, rental cars, hotels, cruise lines, and railroad services;
for example, see Bitran and Mondschein (1995), Gallego and van Ryzin (1997), Ladany and Arbel (1991), You (1999), and
the references therein. The reason these travel industries are particularly suitable for dynamic pricing is that the inventory
cannot be replenished and unsold products have little salvage value. A firm has incentive to increase the price if the sale
goes well initially in order to reserve products for potential later customers who may be willing to pay more. On the other
hand, if the sale does not go well in the beginning, a firm may want to lower the price to induce sales because unsold prod-
ucts have little salvage value. Interested readers can refer to Elmaghraby and Keskinocak (2003), McGill and van Ryzin
(1999), or Weatherford and Bodily (1992) for a general survey on dynamic pricing and its role in revenue management.
The earliest work concerning dynamic pricing appears to be that of Kincaid and Darling (1963). Since the deregulation
of the US airline industry in the 1970s, the research on dynamic pricing continued to grow to provide tools for the indus-
tries. The majority of research published in the open literature, however, assumes the firm enjoys monopolistic power. An
important assumption of such a monopolistic model is that the distribution of the random demand depends solely on the
price set by the monopolist. Although this assumption is quite realistic in the past when it is difficult for a customer to
compare prices, it can be problematic nowadays because of the Internet. With a few clicks on the keyboard, a customer
can easily extract the real-time price of an airline ticket. Although there are loyal customers (memberships, personal pref-
erences, or other reasons) who will always choose a particular airline, many customers have schedules flexible enough to
take either itinerary, and will take into account the price when purchasing the tickets. Consequently, the demand for a0377-2217/$ - see front matter  2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.ejor.2007.12.040
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motivates our work in this paper.
Our work makes three significant contributions to existing literature on dynamic pricing: (1) when real-time inventory
levels are public information, we show the existence of Nash equilibrium in a multistage game; (2) we show that the price
monotonicity found in most monopolistic models need not hold true when there is competition; and (3) we develop a heu-
ristic policy that requires only the initial – but not the real-time – inventory levels of a firm’s competitors, and numerically
evaluate its performance under different information structures.
1.1. Related research
Monopolistic dynamic pricing models have been well studied in the literature, such as those studied by Chatwin (2000),
Feng and Xiao (2000), Gallego and van Ryzin (1994, 1997), Lin (2004) and Zhao and Zheng (2000). In the stream of this
work, a firm that enjoys monopolistic power uses its price as a tool to induce demand, with the objective to maximize the
total expected revenue when the sale ends. Because the optimal policy is often difficult to find analytically, in many cases
the authors first establish structural properties of the optimal policy, and then develop an algorithm to compute or to
approximate it. In other cases, the authors develop efficient heuristic policies.
There is limited research in revenue management of perishable products that concerns competition between firms.
Dudey (1992) studies a duopoly model where two firms offer identical products so a customer always chooses the one with
a lower price. Li and Oum (1997) and Netessine and Shumsky (2005), respectively, examine the competition between two
airlines, each of which has two fare classes. The prices of two fare classes are identical for the two airlines, and each airline
has to decide how many seats to reserve for the high fare class. However, the competition is static because the seat allo-
cation decision is made before the tickets go on sale, and cannot be changed later on. Perakis and Sood (2004) provides a
multiple-period pricing model for perishable products in a competitive market. The demand faced by the sellers is a deter-
ministic function of the prices set by all sellers. In their model, at the beginning of the sales horizon the sellers solve a one-
time optimization problem to set the price path, rather than setting the price at the beginning of each time period according
to the real-time inventory levels. Our game-theoretic model differs from these studies because our model allows firms to
dynamically set product prices in real-time.
There is a growing interest in recent years on competition between retailers in the context of supply chain management.
For competition models where a retailer chooses a capacity (no inventory replenishment) and sets a price (no dynamic
pricing), see Benoit and Krishna (1987), Herk (1993), and the references therein. In some other works, retailers can
replenish their inventory. Common criteria for retailers are to maximize expected profit in a finite-time setting, or to max-
imize the long-run average profit on an infinite-time horizon. For recent examples, see Cachon and Zipkin (1999), Hopp
and Xu (2003), Lippman and McCardle (1997), Mahajan and van Ryzin (2001), Netessine and Rudi (2003), and the ref-
erences therein. Papers that incorporate the price as a decision variable and allow inventory replenishment includes, for
example, Bernstein and Federgruen (2003, 2004) and Kirman and Sobel (1974). However, conditional on the total real-
ized demand, the demand for each firm is often formulated as a deterministic function of prices. To the best of our knowl-
edge, there is no published papers that study price competition with discrete customer choices. Our work in this paper fills
this research gap.
1.2. Overview and outline
In this paper, we develop a game-theoretic model to describe the dynamic price competition between firms who offer
substitutable products. Each firm offers one product and starts with a given number of items in the beginning of sale.
We use a discrete-time model with the length of a time period short enough so that in each time period at most one cus-
tomer can arrive. As the sale goes on, a firm can dynamically change its product price in each time period. When a cus-
tomer arrives, he first compares these substitutable products and their prices, and then either buys one item of his most
preferable product, or leaves empty-handed. Specifically, we use the multinomial logic choice model – which is commonly
used in marketing science (for example, see Franses and Paap (2001) and Lilien et al. (1992)) – to describe a customer’s
discrete choice. A major distinction of our model from existing dynamic pricing models is that the probability a customer
purchases a product not only depends on its price, but also on prices of other substitutable products. The goal of each firm
is to maximize the expected total revenue when the sale ends.
Because there are multiple firms in the game, each firm’s optimal policy depends on what other firms do. By assuming
each firm knows the real-time inventory levels of all other firms, we characterize the price and the expected revenue in Nash
equilibrium. What is somehow surprising is that the price in Nash equilibrium does not exhibit some common structural
properties one would expect in a monopolistic dynamic pricing model. For example, a monopolistic firm should set a
higher price when the demand becomes larger or when the supply becomes smaller. In an oligopoly, however, the preceding
needs not be true in general. This observation has significant managerial implication.
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and to establish a Nash equilibrium based on this assumption, in practice, however, keeping track of the inventory
levels of the other firms can be expensive, or sometimes impossible. For example, it is relatively easy to know the
capacity of the aircraft used by the other airline, but difficult to know the number of seats still available. When
the real-time inventory levels of the other firms are not available, we propose a heuristic policy based on our findings
from the full information model. We use numerical examples to evaluate the heuristic policy under different informa-
tion structures.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our game-theoretic model. Section 3 concerns the case
of complete information such that the real-time inventory levels of all firms are public information. We show the existence
of Nash equilibrium and present a counterexample to price monotonicity often found in monopolistic models. Section 4
discusses the case of incomplete information when a firm knows only the initial – but not the real-time – inventory levels of
the other firms. We develop a heuristic policy and numerically compare the expected revenue under different information
structures. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper and points out future research directions.2. Model and preliminaries
Consider n firms that sell substitutable products over T time periods, where we count the time period in the reverse chro-
nological order so that period 1 represents the last period. In period T, firm i starts with ci items of its product in inventory,
i ¼ 1; . . . ; n. Inventory cannot be replenished during the sale and unsold items at the end of period 1 have no salvage value.
Customers arrive from period T to period 1 according to a Bernoulli process such that in each period the probability a
customer arrives is k and the probability that no customer arrives is 1 k. This assumption of customer arrival process
can be used to approximate a nonhomogeneous Poisson process (with proper time scale), and was commonly used in rev-
enue management literature; for example, see Lautenbacher and Stidham (1999), Subramanian et al. (1999) and You
(1999).
At the beginning of each time period, each firm sets its product price. A customer compares the prices of all products
and then decides whether to buy one unit of his most preferable product or not to buy at all. In this paper, we use the
multinomial logit (MNL) model to describe the customer’s discrete choice. The MNL model is widely used in marketing
science literature, and it assumes that each customer acts independently to maximize its own utility; see Lilien et al. (1992)
or Franses and Paap (2001) for more discussions on the MNL model. Specifically, for each customer, the utility for pur-
chasing one product from firm i at price pi is equal toUi ¼ ai  bpi þ Zi; i ¼ 1; . . . ; n;
and the utility of no purchase isU 0 ¼ Z0:
The parameter ai models the quality, brand image, and the popularity of firm i’s product, and b represents the price re-
sponse coefficient. The random variables Zi, i ¼ 0; . . . ; n, describe the idiosyncratic preference of each customer, and are
independent and identically distributed Gumbel random variables with the following distribution function:P ðZi 6 zÞ ¼ expððe
zl
g ÞÞ; z 2 ð1;1Þ;where l is a shift parameter and g is a scale parameter. When facing a price vector p ¼ ðp1; . . . ; pnÞ, where pi denotes the
price set by firm i, a customer will maximize its utility. In other words, a customer will buy one item from firm i with prob-






1þPnj¼1eajbpj ; i ¼ 1; . . . ; n; ð1Þ
and will leave empty-handed with probabilityq0ðpÞ ¼
1
1þPnj¼1eajbpj : ð2Þ
When calculating qiðpÞ, for i ¼ 0; . . . ; n, we have let l ¼ 0 and g ¼ 1 without loss of generality, because these parameters
can be absorbed into the constants ai, i ¼ 1; . . . ; n, and b.
From Eq. (1), we see that qiðpÞ – the probability firm i sells one item – is monotonically decreasing in its price pi, and that
lim
pi!1
qiðpÞ ¼ limpi!1 piqiðpÞ ¼ 0; i ¼ 1; . . . ; n:
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the expected revenue is equal to 0. In addition, if a firm sells out its product before the sale ends, then its product price –
from the customers’ and the other firms’ standpoints – becomes infinity for the rest of the sales horizon. The objective for
each firm is to dynamically set its product price in order to maximize the expected total revenue when it sells out its entire
stock or when the sale ends.
3. The case of complete information
This section concerns the situation in which each firm can track the real-time inventory levels of all other firms. In the
beginning of each time period, a firm first finds out the respective number of items every other firm still has, and then
chooses its product price. In Section 3.1, we prove the existence of Nash equilibrium of this multistage game with complete
information. In Section 3.2, we discuss the price monotonicity that is commonly found in a monopolistic model.
3.1. Existence of Nash equilibrium
To prove the existence of Nash equilibrium, we first consider the single-period game when T ¼ 1. Suppose ci P 1 for
i ¼ 1; . . . ; n. Because there is only one-time period left, the common objective for all firms is to maximize the expected rev-
enue from the arriving customer. Let pi denote the price set by firm i, for i ¼ 1; . . . ; n, and p ¼ ðp1; . . . ; pnÞ the joint price
vector. The payoff function (the immediate expected revenue from the arriving customer) for firm i ispiðpÞ  pi  qiðpÞ ¼
pie
aibpi
1þPnj¼1eajbpj ; i ¼ 1; . . . ; n: ð3Þ
Bernstein and Federgruen (2004) showed that this single-period game has a unique Nash equilibrium, in which each firm’s
price is the best response to the prices posted by the others, so that no firm has incentive to change its price. In the rest of
this paper, we will refer a firm’s price in the unique Nash equilibrium of the single-period model as the myopic price, be-
cause each firm maximizes the immediate expected revenue and does not take into account how the potential sale might
affect its inventory and therefore its revenue in the future. These myopic prices would indeed describe the Nash equilibrium
if a customer arrives in the last period, or if each firm has unlimited inventory.
To define a Nash equilibrium when there are tP 2 time periods remaining on the sales horizon, we use mathematical
induction and assume that a Nash equilibrium exists for periods 1; 2; . . . ; t  1. Denote the current inventory vector by
s  ðs1; . . . ; snÞ with the interpretation that firm i still has si items in inventory, i ¼ 1; . . . ; n. Moreover, let V iðs; t  1Þ denote
firm i’s expected total revenue from period t  1 to period 1 if all firms use equilibrium strategies from period t  1 to per-
iod 1. The boundary condition requires that V iðs; 0Þ ¼ 0 for all i and all s, and V iðs; tÞ ¼ 0 if si ¼ 0 and t ¼ 1; 2; . . . Consider
the beginning of period t. If no customer arrives in period t, then the firms simply carry over their respective inventories to
the beginning of period t  1. On the other hand, if a customer arrives in period t, then the game between the firms is such
that firm i chooses pi to maximize its payoff function Piðp; s; tÞ, i ¼ 1; . . . ; n, wherePiðp; s; tÞ  qiðpÞðpi þ V iðs ei; t  1ÞÞ þ
Xn
j¼1;j–i
qjðpÞV iðs ej; t  1Þ þ q0ðpÞV iðs; t  1Þ
¼ pi þ V iðs ei; t  1Þ þ
Xn
j¼0;j–i
qjðpÞðV iðs ej; t  1Þ  V iðs ei; t  1Þ  piÞ; ð4Þwhere ei represents a 1 n vector whose ith entry is equal to 1 and all others equal to 0, and e0  ð0; 0; . . . ; 0Þ is the zero
vector.
If there exists a Nash equilibrium – denoted by pðs; tÞ – in the game whose payoff functions are specified by Eq. (4), then
we can define the equilibrium expected revenue for firm i from period t to period 1 byV iðs; tÞ ¼ kPiðpðs; tÞ; s; tÞ þ ð1 kÞV iðs; t  1Þ;
because a customer shows up in each period with probability k. To validate this approach, we first present two lemmas,
based on which we then give the main theorem that guarantees the existence of a Nash equilibrium at the beginning of
each period.
We say a function f ðxÞ is strongly quasi-concave in x if there exists an x^ such that f ðxÞ increases in x for x < x^, and
decreases in x for x > x^.
Lemma 3.1. The payoff function Piðp; s; tÞ is strongly quasi-concave in pi.
Proof. Taking the first derivative of Piðp; s; tÞ with respect to pi yields
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opi
¼ qiðpÞ 1 b
Xn
j¼0;j–i
qjðpÞðpi þ V iðs ei; t  1Þ  V iðs ej; t  1ÞÞ
 !
; ð5ÞLet hiðpÞ  1 b
Pn
j¼0;j–iqjðpÞðpi þ V iðs ei; t  1Þ  V iðs ej; t  1ÞÞ. Fix p1; . . . ; pi1, piþ1; . . . ; pn, and consider the fol-
lowing two cases:
1. The function hiðpÞ–0 for all pi P 0:Because hðpiÞ is continuous and limpi!1hðpiÞ ¼ 1, it follows that hðpiÞ < 0 for
pi P 0. Hence, Piðp; s; tÞ strictly decreases in pi for pi P 0, and therefore is strongly quasi-concave.
2. There exists p^i such that hiðp1; . . . ; pi1; p^i; piþ1; . . . ; pnÞ ¼ 0:The second derivative of Piðp; s; tÞ with respect to pi evalu-





























¼ bqiðpÞjpi¼p^i < 0;where the third equality follows from hiðpÞjpi¼p^i ¼ 0. The preceding shows that p^i is a local maximum of Piðp; s; tÞ and that
there does not exist an interior minimum for pi 2 ½0;1Þ. It then follows that p^i is unique because otherwise there must
exists an interior minimum for Piðp; s; tÞ. Consequently, the function Piðp; s; tÞ increases for pi 2 ½0; p^iÞ and decreases
for pi 2 ðp^i;1Þ, and therefore is strongly quasi-concave.
The lemma follows because Piðp; s; tÞ is strongly quasi-concave in pi in both cases. h
From the preceding lemma, we can define the best response function when a customer arrives in period t and firm i still
has si items in inventory, i ¼ 1; . . . ; n, as follows:
Uiðpi; s; tÞ  argmax
pi
Piðp; s; tÞ: ð6ÞWe next show that this best response function is uniformly bounded.
Lemma 3.2. The best response function is uniformly bounded. That is, suppiUiðpi; s; tÞ < 1.
Proof. In state ðs; t  1Þ, denote bij  V iðs ei; t  1Þ þ V iðs ej; t  1Þ, and let bi  maxjbij, which is some constant.
Rewrite Eq. (5) as follows:oPiðp; s; tÞ
opi



















1þ eai ; ð8ÞEq. (7) becomes negative ifpi > bi þ
1þ eai
b
:In other words, Pðp; s; tÞ decreases in pi for pi > bi þ ð1þ eaiÞ=b regardless what prices the other firms choose. Therefore,
firm i does not need to consider any price that is greater than bi þ ð1þ eaiÞ=b. Consequently, we can conclude that
suppiUiðpi; s; tÞ 6 bi þ ð1þ eaiÞ=b, which completes the proof. h
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Proof. The existence of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium follows from Theorem 2.1 in Vives (1999) – originally attributed
to Debreu (1952) – which states that a Nash equilibrium exists if the strategy sets are nonempty convex and compact, and
the payoff to firm i is continuous in the actions of all firms and quasi-concave in its own action. In our multiple-period
model, although each firm can choose a price from ½0;1Þ, which is not compact, Lemma 3.2 allows us to construct an
equivalent game by restricting firm i to choose a price from a nonempty convex and compact set. In addition, as seen
in Eq. (4), the payoff function Piðp; s; tÞ is continuous in pj, j ¼ 1; . . . ; n. Finally, according to Lemma 3.1, the payoff func-
tion Piðp; s; tÞ is quasi-concave in pi. Consequently, a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium exists. h
The proof of the uniqueness of Nash equilibrium is much more difficult because we cannot quantify the terms V ið; Þ in a
firm’s payoff function, and standard methods – such as diagonal dominance condition – turn out to be fruitless. Below we
offer a plausible way to choose one Nash equilibrium if there are multiple Nash equilibria. In numerical experiments, how-
ever, we have not encountered any instance with multiple Nash equilibria.
Let pðs; tÞ denote one Nash equilibrium with inventory vector s and t time periods to go. At this equilibrium, the payoff












200Piðpðs; tÞ; s; tÞ ¼ pi ðs; tÞ þ V iðs ei; t  1Þ þ
Xn
j¼0;j–i
qjðpðs; tÞÞðV iðs ej; t  1Þ  V iðs ei; t  1Þ  pi ðs; tÞÞ
¼ pi ðs; tÞ þ V iðs ei; t  1Þ 
1
b
;where the second equality follows because pðs; tÞ must satisfy Eq. (5). In other words, a firm’s payoff function increases
linearly in its equilibrium price if there are more than one Nash equilibrium. Naturally, if there are multiple equilibria, each
firm prefers to play its highest equilibrium price. To ensure our notations are consistent, we use p1ðs; tÞ to denote the highest
Nash equilibrium price for firm 1 in period t if the inventory vector is s, and use pi ðs; tÞ to denote the Nash equilibrium
price for firm i, i–1, when firm 1 sets its price to p1ðs; tÞ. In addition, the value function V ið; Þ for firm i, i ¼ 1; . . . ; n,
are defined according to this Nash equilibrium.
3.2. On price monotonicity
When a firm dynamically sets its product price in a monopolistic setting, a rule of thumb is that the price should be set
higher if, loosely speaking, the demand becomes larger or if the supply becomes smaller. Specifically, with the same number
of items in inventory, the firm should set a higher price if there is more time remaining. Somewhat surprisingly, the price
monotonicity in remaining time for sale does not hold true in general when there is competition. Consider a two-firm exam-
ple in which a1 ¼ 5, a2 ¼ 4, b ¼ 0:1, k ¼ 0:1, and initial inventory levels c1 ¼ 20, c2 ¼ 10. Table 1 reports the prices in Nash
equilibrium for both firms with different values of T. As seen in Table 1, the price in Nash equilibrium for each firm
decreases in T when T is relatively small, and then increases in T when T becomes large.
To understand this interesting phenomenon intuitively, first compute the myopic prices in the single-period game dis-
cussed in Eq. (3). In this numerical example, the myopic prices for the two firms are p1 ¼ 23:02 and p2 ¼ 16:57, respectively;
the customer choice probabilities with respect to these myopic prices are q1 ¼ 0:5655, q2 ¼ 0:3964, and q0 ¼ 0:0380.
As seen in Table 1, when T ¼ 20, the total number of customers follows a binomial distribution with expected value
equal to kT ¼ 2, and standard deviation approximately equal to 1.34. Because almost certainly the number of customers
will not exceed 10, both firms have abundant inventory so that the myopic prices prevail. In this case, the number of cus-
tomers dictates the number of items each firm can sell, and no matter how low the two firms reduce their prices, neither firm1
in equilibrium need not be monotonic in the remaining time for sale
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will come close to firm 2’s initial inventory level becomes significant, so firm 2 has incentive to lower its price to induce
more sales. From firm 1’s standpoint, it also has incentive to lower its price not only to remain competitive, but also to
help drive firm 2’s price further down – which helps firm 2 sell out more quickly so firm 1 may enjoy monopoly toward
the end. Consequently, both firms benefit from lowering their prices. As T continues to increase, it becomes more and more
likely that either firm will sell out its entire inventory before the sale ends if it uses the myopic (or even lower) price. There-
fore, both firms should increase their prices to take advantage of the increasing number of customers.
4. The case of incomplete information
In Section 3, we discuss a multiple-period game with complete information in the sense that each firm keeps track of the
real-time inventory levels of all other firms. Although the assumption of complete information and the conclusion of the
existence of a Nash equilibrium are theoretically appealing, in practice, however, it may be expensive, or sometimes even
impossible, for a firm to keep track of real-time inventory levels of the other firms. In this section, we consider a different
information structure, in which a firm knows the initial inventory levels of the other firms, but cannot keep track of their
real-time sales records. In Section 4.1, we develop a heuristic policy under this information structure. In Section 4.2, we
conduct numerical experiments with a two-firm model. We evaluate this heuristic policy in different scenarios depending
on the information available to the other firm and its intension.
4.1. The interpolation heuristic
In this section, we consider the dynamic pricing problem from the standpoint of firm 1, and develop a heuristic policy
that requires only the initial – but not the real-time – inventory levels of the other firms. The assumption of knowing the
initial inventory levels of the other firms is reasonable; for example, the capacity of the aircraft used by another airline is
usually public information.
When developing a heuristic policy, we are most interested in a policy that works well for a real-world problem. Recall
from Section 3.1 that the myopic prices constitute the Nash equilibrium if each firm has more items in inventory than the
maximum possible number of customers; that is, T 6 minici. In this extreme and unrealistic case, in the Nash equilibrium
each firm uses a fixed-price policy (the myopic price), and dynamic pricing is not at all necessary. The effect of dynamic
pricing becomes more prominent if there are more customers, or if the firms have fewer items. In a real-world problem,
it is usually the case that the number of items is much smaller than the number of potential customers who inquire product
prices. For example, based on one author’s experience at United Airline, a flight’s price is usually exposed to thousands of
people, and only a small portion of those people end up buying a ticket. With these observations, in our mathematical
framework we are particularly interested in a dynamic pricing heuristic that works well under the condition when
kT Pni¼1ci – the expected number of potential customers is much larger than the total number of items from all firms.
The rationale of our heuristic policy stems from two observations of the equilibrium prices in the complete information
model discussed in Section 3. First, when kt Pni¼1si, the equilibrium price vector pðs; tÞ ¼ ðp1ðs; tÞ; . . . ; pnðs; tÞÞ has the
property that ktqiðpðs; tÞÞ – the expected number of items firm i can sell with the current equilibrium price vector – is
roughly equal to si, for i ¼ 1; . . . ; n. Second, when kt 
Pn
i¼1si, firm i’s equilibrium price p

i ðs; tÞ is not sensitive to small
changes in sj, j–i. The first observation suggests that each firm intends to sell its items evenly spread out across time,
and the second observation suggests that if a firm knows only roughly the inventory levels of the other firms, it can approx-
imate the equilibrium price to a good extent.
Based on these observations, we propose a heuristic policy that interpolates the equilibrium prices. Specifically, with this
heuristic policy a firm assumes that the other firms sell their products at a constant pace, and calculates its own price by
interpolating the prices in Nash equilibrium. Because of the aforementioned two observations, the interpolated price
should be close to the equilibrium price in the complete information model.
We illustrate in details this heuristic policy from the standpoint of firm 1 with a two-firm example as follows:
1. With T time periods to go, record firm i’s initial inventory level and denote it by ci, i ¼ 1; 2. Set the price equal to the
equilibrium price p1ðc1; c2; T Þ defined in Section 3.1.
2. At the beginning of period t, t ¼ T  1; T  2; . . . ; 1, observe the current inventory s1, and compute a2 ¼ c2t=T and
d2 ¼ ba2c.
3. Set the price – which depends only on s1, c2, t, and T – equal to~p1ðs1; tÞ ¼ p1ðs1; d2; tÞ þ ða2  d2Þ½p1ðs1; d2 þ 1; tÞ  p1ðs1; d2; tÞ: ð9ÞWe call this heuristic policy the interpolation heuristic because it linearly interpolates the Nash equilibrium prices.
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p1ðs1; s2; . . . ; sn; tÞ
" #
;where ci is the initial inventory level of firm i, ai ¼ cit=T , and di ¼ baic, i ¼ 2; . . . ; n, and that the indicator function 1ðAÞ is
equal to 1 if statement A is true, and is equal to 0 otherwise.4.2. Numerical experiments with a two-firm model
In this section, we let firm 1 use the interpolation heuristic and evaluate its performance in a two-firm model. We con-
sider three scenarios: In the first scenario, we let firm 2 have complete information as to what firm 1 is doing, and let firm 2
maximize its own expected revenue. This scenario allows us to evaluate the interpolation heuristic when the two firms have
asymmetric information. In the second scenario, we assume that neither firm has full information, and let both firms use
the same interpolation heuristic. In the third scenario, we let firm 2 have complete information, and let firm 2 use the policy
that minimizes firm 1’s expected revenue – called predatory pricing. This scenario provides a lower bound on the expected
revenue from the interpolation heuristic.
In the first scenario, let U 2ðs1; s2; tÞ denote the maximized expected total revenue for firm 2 at the beginning of period t if




ðq2ð~p1ðs1; tÞ; p2Þðp2 þ U 2ðs1; s2  1; t  1ÞÞ þ q1ð~p1ðs1; tÞ; p2ÞU 2ðs1  1; s2; t  1Þ
þ q0ð~p1ðs1; tÞ; p2ÞU 2ðs1; s2; t  1ÞÞ

þ ð1 kÞU 2ðs1; s2; t  1Þ; ð10Þwhere ~p1ðs1; tÞ is defined by Eq. (9). The boundary conditions are U 2ð; 0; Þ ¼ U 2ð; ; 0Þ ¼ 0. Letting ~p2ðs1; s2; tÞ denote firm
2’s optimal price solved from Eq. (10), we can calculate the expected revenue for firm 1 in state ðs1; s2; tÞ with the following
recursive equation:U 1ðs1; s2; tÞ ¼ k½q1ð~p1ðs1; tÞ; p2ðs1; s2; tÞÞð~p1ðs1; tÞ þ U 1ðs1  1; s2; tÞÞ þ q2ð~p1ðs1; tÞ; p2ðs1; s2; tÞÞU 1ðs1; s2  1; tÞ
þ q0ð~p1ðs1; tÞ; p2ðs1; s2; tÞÞU 1ðs1; s2; tÞ þ ð1 kÞU 1ðs1; s2; t  1Þ: ð11ÞThe boundary conditions are U 1ð0; ; Þ ¼ U 1ð; ; 0Þ ¼ 0.
In the second scenario, neither firm can keep track of the other’s real-time inventory level, so that both firms use the
same interpolation heuristic. Because either firm can compute the price by Eq. (9) beforehand, we can use a recursive equa-
tion similar to Eq. (11) to compute the expected revenue of either firm.
In the third scenario, we let firm 2 use the predatory pricing to minimize firm 1’s expected revenue. Let W 1ðs1; s2; tÞ
denote the minimized expected total revenue for firm 1 at the beginning of period t if firm i still has si items in inventory,
i ¼ 1; 2. The recursive equation for W 1ð; ; Þ isW 1ðs1; s2; tÞ ¼ k½min
p2
ðq1ð~p1ðs1; tÞ; p2Þð~p1ðs1; tÞ þ W ðs1  1; s2; t  1ÞÞ þ q2ð~p1ðs1; tÞ; p2ÞW 1ðs1; s2  1; t  1Þ
þ q0ð~p1ðs1; tÞ; p2ÞW 1ðs1; s2; t  1ÞÞ þ ð1 kÞW 1ðs1; s2; t  1Þ; ð12Þ2
ed revenues: c1 ¼ 30, a1 ¼ 1, a2 ¼ 0:5, b ¼ 0:01, T ¼ 2000, and k ¼ 0:1
Equilibriuma ($) Heuristic vs. optimalb Heuristic vs. heuristicc Lower boundd
Firm 1 Firm 2 Firm 1 Firm 2 Firm 1 Firm 2 Firm 1
7729 3060 0.9997 1.0002 0.9998 0.9963 0.9869
7542 4786 0.9991 1.0007 0.9999 0.9947 0.9863
7349 5879 0.9973 1.0017 0.9996 0.9941 0.9849
7160 6516 0.9940 1.0031 0.9992 0.9956 0.9811
7002 6811 0.9898 1.0048 0.9979 1.0007 0.9707
th firms use the prices in equilibrium when real-time inventory levels are public information.
m 1 uses the interpolation heuristic, and firm 2 – knowing firm 1’s real-time inventory level – maximizes its own expected revenue.
th firms use the interpolation heuristic.
m 1 uses the interpolation heuristic, and firm 2 – knowing firm 1’s real-time inventory level – minimizes firm 1’s expected revenue.
Table 3
Expected revenues: c1 ¼ 30, a1 ¼ 1, a2 ¼ 1, b ¼ 0:01, T ¼ 2000, and k ¼ 0:1
c2 Equilibrium
a ($) Heuristic vs. optimalb Heuristic vs. heuristicc Lower boundd
Firm 1 Firm 2 Firm 1 Firm 2 Firm 1 Firm 2 Firm 1
10 7728 3552 0.9991 1.0004 0.9990 0.9969 0.9847
20 7538 5767 0.9971 1.0011 0.9973 0.9956 0.9843
30 7338 7338 0.9937 1.0021 0.9947 0.9948 0.9836
40 7131 8433 0.9886 1.0038 0.9919 0.9945 0.9820
50 6924 9135 0.9817 1.0062 0.9901 0.9951 0.9780
a Both firms use the prices in equilibrium when real-time inventory levels are public information.
b Firm 1 uses the interpolation heuristic, and firm 2 – knowing firm 1’s real-time inventory level – maximizes its own expected revenue.
c Both firms use the interpolation heuristic.
d Firm 1 uses the interpolation heuristic, and firm 2 – knowing firm 1’s real-time inventory level – minimizes firm 1’s expected revenue.
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this scenario W 1ð; ; Þ serves as a lower bound for the interpolation heuristic. The expected total revenues for firm 2 can be
calculated by a recursive equation similar to Eq. (11).
Table 2 presents numerical results for c1 ¼ 30 and c2 ranging from 10 to 50. We let a1 ¼ 1, a2 ¼ 0:5, b ¼ 0:01, T ¼ 2000,
and k ¼ 0:1. The first two columns present the expected revenue in Nash equilibrium defined in Section 3.1. The rest of the
table concerns the performance of the interpolation heuristic in scenarios 1, 2, and 3, respectively, with the results presented
as the fraction of the expected revenue in Nash equilibrium. Finally, Tables 3 and 4 repeat Table 2 with a2 changed to 1 and
2, respectively.
As seen in Tables 2–4, the interpolation heuristic works very well in the first scenario, when the two firms have asym-
metric information. Even without knowing firm 2’s real-time inventory level, firm 1 still attains at least 97% of the revenue
in the complete information model. Although firm 2 can benefit from firm 1’s lack of complete information, the benefit is
almost negligible. These results are not surprising because the interpolation heuristic serves as a very good approximation
to the price in Nash equilibrium, so firm 2’s best response is also close to its own Nash equilibrium price. Consequently, theTable 4
Expected revenues: c1 ¼ 30, a1 ¼ 1, a2 ¼ 2, b ¼ 0:01, T ¼ 2000, and k ¼ 0:1
c2 Equilibrium
a ($) Heuristic vs. optimalb Heuristic vs. heuristicc Lower boundd
Firm 1 Firm 2 Firm 1 Firm 2 Firm 1 Firm 2 Firm 1
10 7727 4543 0.9982 1.0005 0.9979 0.9978 0.9832
20 7534 7745 0.9955 1.0011 0.9950 0.9972 0.9829
30 7329 10297 0.9914 1.0019 0.9907 0.9969 0.9649
40 7112 12359 0.9856 1.0033 0.9853 0.9971 0.9649
50 6881 14002 0.9780 1.0053 0.9798 0.9969 0.9646
a Both firms use the prices in equilibrium when real-time inventory levels are public information.
b Firm 1 uses the interpolation heuristic, and firm 2 – knowing firm 1’s real-time inventory level – maximizes its own expected revenue.
c Both firms use the interpolation heuristic.
d Firm 1 uses the interpolation heuristic, and firm 2 – knowing firm 1’s real-time inventory level – minimizes firm 1’s expected revenue.
Table 5
Expected revenues: c1 ¼ 30, a1 ¼ 1, a2 ¼ 0:5, b ¼ 0:01, T ¼ 1000, and k ¼ 0:1
c2 Equilibrium
a ($) Heuristic vs. optimalb Heuristic vs. heuristicc Lower boundd
Firm 1 Firm 2 Firm 1 Firm 2 Firm 1 Firm 2 Firm 1
10 4926 2137 0.9931 1.0160 1.0029 0.9892 0.9858
20 4551 2836 0.9907 1.0280 1.0116 1.0032 0.9702
30 4358 2957 0.9872 1.0396 1.0096 1.0287 0.9005
40 4343 2960 0.9861 1.0429 1.0044 1.0336 0.7821
50 4342 2960 0.9861 1.0429 1.0043 1.0337 0.6803
a Both firms use the prices in equilibrium when real-time inventory levels are public information.
b Firm 1 uses the interpolation heuristic, and firm 2 – knowing firm 1’s real-time inventory level – maximizes its own expected revenue.
c Both firms use the interpolation heuristic.
d Firm 1 uses the interpolation heuristic, and firm 2 – knowing firm 1’s real-time inventory level – minimizes firm 1’s expected revenue.
Table 6
Expected revenues: c1 ¼ 30, a1 ¼ 1, a2 ¼ 1, b ¼ 0:01, T ¼ 1000, and k ¼ 0:1
c2 Equilibrium
a ($) Heuristic vs. optimalb Heuristic vs. heuristicc Lower boundd
Firm 1 Firm 2 Firm 1 Firm 2 Firm 1 Firm 2 Firm 1
10 4918 2616 0.9808 1.0071 0.9824 0.9904 0.9640
20 4498 3751 0.9871 1.0127 0.9925 0.9903 0.9621
30 4139 4139 0.9825 1.0254 0.9976 0.9978 0.9350
40 4014 4172 0.9758 1.0365 0.9960 1.0087 0.8371
50 4010 4172 0.9703 1.0374 0.9965 1.0072 0.7040
a Both firms use the prices in equilibrium when real-time inventory levels are public information.
b Firm 1 uses the interpolation heuristic, and firm 2 – knowing firm 1’s real-time inventory level – maximizes its own expected revenue.
c Both firms use the interpolation heuristic.
d Firm 1 uses the interpolation heuristic, and firm 2 – knowing firm 1’s real-time inventory level – minimizes firm 1’s expected revenue.
Table 7
Expected revenues: c1 ¼ 30, a1 ¼ 1, a2 ¼ 2, b ¼ 0:01, T ¼ 1000, and k ¼ 0:1
c2 Equilibrium
a ($) Heuristic vs. optimalb Heuristic vs. heuristicc Lower boundd
Firm 1 Firm 2 Firm 1 Firm 2 Firm 1 Firm 2 Firm 1
10 4909 3592 0.9812 1.0064 0.9996 0.9928 0.9398
20 4462 5677 0.9821 1.0130 1.0030 0.9933 0.9304
30 3992 6927 0.9833 1.0235 1.0192 0.9981 0.9169
40 3540 7500 0.9771 1.0415 1.0336 1.0048 0.9028
50 3250 7537 0.9672 1.0686 1.0668 1.0324 0.8658
a Both firms use the prices in equilibrium when real-time inventory levels are public information.
b Firm 1 uses the interpolation heuristic, and firm 2 – knowing firm 1’s real-time inventory level – maximizes its own expected revenue.
c Both firms use the interpolation heuristic.
d Firm 1 uses the interpolation heuristic, and firm 2 – knowing firm 1’s real-time inventory level – minimizes firm 1’s expected revenue.
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effectiveness of the interpolation heuristic.
In the second scenario, neither firm has complete information and both firms use the interpolation heuristic. Once again,
because the interpolation heuristic approximates the equilibrium price in the complete information model well, the
expected revenues of both firms are very close to those in the complete information model.
In the third scenario, the lower bound on the interpolation heuristic is very encouraging as seen in the last column of
Tables 2–4. In these examples, this lower bound guarantees firm 1’s expected revenue to be consistently well above 95% of
the revenue in Nash equilibrium even when firm 2 uses predatory pricing. In order to minimize firm 1’s expected revenue,
most of the time firm 2 uses a very low price to prevent the customer from buying firm 1’s products. Consequently, as c2
increases, firm 2 can take more customers away, which makes it more difficult for firm 1 to sell an item – even if firm 1 uses
the Nash equilibrium price. In other words, the difference between the equilibrium revenue and this lower bound is mostly
due to the extremely low prices posted by firm 2, rather than due to the difference between our heuristic policy and the
equilibrium price.
Whereas Tables 2–4 report results when the interpolation heuristic is supposed to work well, Tables 5–7 report results
for T ¼ 1000 so that kT is in the same order as c1 þ c2. As seen in these tables, the expected revenues in the first scenario
(firm 2 has complete information and maximizes its own expected revenue) and in the second scenario (firm 2 has incom-
plete information and uses the same heuristic) are still close to those in the complete information model, because when the
chance of selling out is small, both firms would use a price close to its myopic price defined in Section 3.1. If the goal of firm
2 is to hurt firm 1, however, then firm 2 can do much damage by lowering its price substantially, as seen in the last column
of Tables 5–7. In practice, unless firm 2 uses predatory pricing, we would expect the interpolation heuristic to produce sat-
isfactory results in general.5. Conclusions
In this paper, we propose a game-theoretic model to describe the dynamic price competition between firms. Upon arri-
val, a customer compares the current product prices and will purchase either his most preferable product or not at all.
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We illustrate numerically how a firm can benefit by taking into account the competition when setting its product price, and
also develop a heuristic policy that does not require real-time inventory levels of the other firms. The findings in this paper
provide managerial insights into dynamic price competition in revenue management.
One assumption we made implicitly by choosing the MNL choice model is the axiom of independence of irrelevant alter-
natives. In other words, when a firm’s inventory is depleted, according to the MNL model all the other firms will benefit
equally with their probability of sale increasing with the same proportion. Whereas this assumption may be reasonable in
industries if the coefficient a is tied with a firm’s popularity (such as airlines), it may not be applicable to other industries if a
is tied with the quality of a product. In the latter case, the depletion of one firm’s inventory would bring more benefit to
those firms that sell products of comparable quality. A different customer choice model is necessary if the axiom of inde-
pendence of irrelevant alternatives does not hold.
In addition to a different discrete choice model, there are a few possible future research directions. First, allowing batch
demand is an important extension because in many cases a customer needs to buy multiple units of the same product. Sec-
ond, if a firm can pay a cost to find out the number of items each competitor still has at any time, then whose inventory
level is most valuable to learn about, how much is a firm willing to pay for this information, and when should a firm do it?
The answers to these questions will further help a manager improve revenue management in a competitive market.Acknowledgements
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